TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/102990/10290011.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 9.5 KB | 201 lines

                                                                                WORLD, Page 48

THE GULF

Trip Wires to War


What would it take for the U.S. to attack Iraq, and how would
Bush square the decision with the U.N. and Congress?

By GEORGE J. CHURCH -- Reported by Michael Duffy and Bruce van
Voorst/Washington


    With an impish smile, Claiborne Pell, Democratic Senator
from Rhode Island and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, waved a newspaper clipping at Secretary of State
James Baker last week. It reported that Soviet Foreign Minister
Eduard Shevardnadze had told his country's parliament he would
seek its prior approval for any military involvement in the
Persian Gulf. "Can you make the same promise?" asked Pell. "We
will continue to consult," replied Baker. But he added, "What
I cannot do is make a general, across-the-board commitment."

    On the eve of its departure from Washington for a two-month
adjournment, Congress was looking for a firmer pledge that the
Administration would not go to war as soon as the legislators
left town. The next day, at a House Foreign Affairs Committee
hearing, Representative Gerry Studds asked Baker if he could
offer assurances that the U.S. would not attack Saddam
Hussein's forces without consulting Congress. "No," said Baker.
Studds then observed that if he were a soldier, "I think I
would put my helmet on." Baker replied, with a smile, "I think
their helmets are on."

    Shevardnadze's parliamentary pledge reflected Mikhail
Gorbachev's conviction that any use of force must be approved
by the United Nations Security Council, a position the U.S.
Congress tends to favor as well. For a while last week it
seemed that the Soviet President might be testing the climate
for a settlement based on a partial Iraqi withdrawal from
Kuwait. Yevgeni Primakov, a Gorbachev aide who had visited
Saddam in Baghdad three weeks ago, met with Bush on Friday and
told him the Iraqi leader would not withdraw from Kuwait prior
to negotiations, as U.S. policy now demands. Bush's reply:
"Tell  him I am not flexible either."

    Washington wants Saddam to be convinced that if he does not
pull out of Kuwait, he will be driven out. But if Bush decides
it must be war, how does he go about starting one? Far more
would be involved than a simple order to begin bombing. What
kind of provocation, if any, the U.S. could cite and what
justification it could find in international law would bear
heavily on whether the U.S. fought the war -- and made a
subsequent peace -- at the head of a global coalition or as a
lone wolf.

    It is possible, of course, that Saddam will ease Bush's
task. U.S. officials have designated a series of acts that the
Iraqi dictator might take as trip wires for an American strike
that could be presented as legitimate self-defense. The most
obvious is an Iraqi attack on the U.S. or other international
forces in Saudi Arabia (or possibly on Israel, although
America's Arab allies would hardly be eager to fight in defense
of what they call the "Zionist entity"). Preparations for an
attack might also suffice. For example, if satellites detected
the fueling of Iraqi missiles, the U.S. and allies might
strike right away.

    Baker has mentioned another trip wire to allies:
mistreatment by the Iraqis of some of their thousands of
hostages -- killing or injuring them or even physically
imprisoning them as the Iranians did with the American hostages
seized in 1979. The justification in that case would be not
self-defense but a principle of international law known as
"humanitarian intervention," which says a nation has the right
to use force to protect its citizens abroad.

    That formula could also apply to the diplomats holed up
inside their embassies in Kuwait City. Baker hopes to win
Security Council approval for a resolution calling for resupply
of food, water and basic necessities to the five embassies
(U.S., Britain, France, Tunisia and Bahrain)  that remain open
despite Saddam's directive to shut down. If Iraq were to reject
the resolution and obstruct resupply efforts to diplomatic
missions he has illegally ordered closed, that might become a
trigger to war. Describing the conveniently vague wording of
the resolution, an Administration official observed, "It's the
type of language you can drive a truck through. Or a
helicopter. Or a missile."

    A terrorist outrage like the blowing up of Pan Am Flight 103
over Scotland in December 1988 might serve as a trip wire too,
provided that it could plausibly be traced to Iraqi
instigation. Two weeks ago, Rifaat el-Mahgoub, the Speaker of
Egypt's Parliament and the second-ranking official in the
country, was shot to death. Cairo blamed Iraq for the attack.
As nerves tighten further, such an atrocity might trigger
massive retaliation. Baker and National Security Adviser Brent
Scowcroft have said that continued Iraqi pillaging, murdering
and raping in Kuwait might shorten the time the U.S. gives for
the embargo to work, a hint that that also might be regarded
as a sufficient cause for war.

    Saddam, however, has been seeking to avoid provocation. For
example, his jet fighters have run away every time U.S. planes
have approached them. If he avoids crossing any of the trip
wires, how could the U.S. justify an attack?

    One school of thought holds that Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, which recognizes the right of self-defense against
armed attack not only for the victim nation but also for others
coming to its aid, gives Washington and its allies all the
justification they need. Many experts, however, read Article
51 as approving the use of force in self-defense only in the
absence of action by the U.N. Security Council. And the
Security Council has passed nine resolutions condemning Iraq
and authorizing a worldwide embargo against it. Thus, in this
view, the time for invoking Article 51 has passed; some other
justification would be needed for military action now.

    Washington has begun preliminary soundings about a Security
Council resolution that would specifically authorize the use
of force. This could be done under Article 42, which provides
that if economic sanctions are inadequate the Security Council
"may take such action by air,  sea or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security." The big problem is that such a resolution might be
vetoed -- probably not by the Soviet Union but quite possibly
by China or perhaps even by France.

    Another problem is that Article 42 contemplates the
formation of a blue-helmeted U.N. force under some sort of
international command. The Soviet Union has indicated that this
is the only basis on which it would send troops to fight
against Iraq. But such an integrated international force might
be very clumsy and time-consuming to set up. Article 39 might
also be invoked, although at the possible cost of Soviet
participation. This provision permits the Security Council to
make "recommendations" to member states on how to restore peace;
the recommendation could simply be to coordinate military
action with the U.S.

    Then there is Capitol Hill. The pace of modern warfare has
rendered declarations of war obsolete, and the War Powers Act
of 1973 has become a virtual dead letter. Every President since
its passage has denounced it as an unconstitutional
infringement on his powers as Commander in Chief, and the
courts have refused to enforce its key provision, which
requires the President within 60 days to pull U.S. forces out
of any situation in which hostilities seem imminent unless the
legislature votes to let them stay.

    The House and Senate have adopted separate resolutions
endorsing all the actions that Bush has taken so far, but
making clear -- or so the framers claimed -- that they did not
confer any advance approval of a decision to fight. There has
been talk of a resolution providing that Bush could order war
only with the specific approval of the U.N., but nobody has
introduced such a resolution yet. Senate Armed Services
Committee chairman Sam Nunn observes that Congress's real power
is the ability to shut off funds for a war. That seems
theoretical, to put it mildly; can anyone seriously imagine
Congress refusing American troops the money to buy the
ammunition to return enemy fire?

    One of the weaknesses of the War Powers Act is that it fails
to specify who should be consulted or exactly when (Ronald
Reagan informed Capitol Hill leaders of the impending U.S. air
strike on Libya in 1986 only after the bombers were in the air
and nearing their targets). Nunn would remedy that by setting
up a bipartisan group that the President would be required to
consult with regularly, including times when Congress is not
in session. That provision could be important; the most widely
repeated war scenario on the Washington rumor circuit calls for
fighting to begin in mid-November -- during the adjournment.

    None of this might matter greatly if a war follows the
quick-knockout script sketched by some Air Force enthusiasts.
In the politics of war, as in other matters, nothing succeeds
like success. Even then, however, the U.S. would need the
support of its world coalition to shape a durable peace. And
at home one need only mention the word Vietnam to underscore
the importance of congressional and popular support.
Unfortunately, the scenarios for fighting a war seem to have
been far more carefully drawn and fully thought out than the
scripts for justifying the decision.